After winning the initial round of the recall vote, Han Kuo-yu secured a firm position as the head of the legislative body.
On the evening of July 31st, the Kuomintang caucus held a dinner gathering in the Legislative Yuan, attended by 32 blue camp legislators. During the gathering, Han Kuo-yu encouraged the legislators, saying, \"Let's win again on August 23rd,\" rallying support for the upcoming second recall battle.
However, right after he finished speaking, the White House announced a new tariff policy, imposing a 20% tax rate on Taiwan. This news quickly spread across Taiwan, triggering strong reactions locally. It wasn't the first time the US had increased tariffs on Taiwan.
展开剩余91%Back in April, the US had announced \"reciprocal tariffs,\" placing Taiwan in the 32% tax rate category at that time. The Taiwanese authorities promptly expressed goodwill towards the US, actively proposing to promote \"zero tariffs\" in exchange for reducing tariffs.
Simultaneously, Taiwan pledged to purchase large American aircraft, expand agricultural imports, and increase military procurement orders. Despite these efforts, in July, the US still imposed a 20% tariff on Taiwan, higher than Japan and South Korea's 15%.
This tariff adjustment was unilaterally announced without completing negotiations. Taiwan claimed it was a \"temporary tax rate\" with room for reduction. However, the US documents did not use the term \"temporary\" and categorized it as officially implemented.
This raised doubts in Taiwanese society about the effectiveness of communication between the Tsai Ing-wen administration and the US. When responding, Tsai emphasized that Taiwan and the US are still negotiating trade and believed that there was still potential to lower the tax rate.
However, at the same time, Taiwanese media revealed that Tsai's request to transit through the US during her planned August visit to South America was also rejected by the White House, the second recent rejection faced by the DPP administration.
These signals indicate that despite the DPP government's pro-US policies, the US has not made reciprocal responses. Moreover, the US decision is not an isolated action. Analysts believe that the current increase in US tariffs on Taiwan is mainly due to two reasons.
First, Taiwan has a long-standing trade surplus with the US. Second, the US intends to apply pressure through tariffs to gain greater concessions in future negotiations. Taiwan's exports to the US mainly focus on electronics and semiconductor industries. These industries have a high dependence on the US market, making them key targets of US pressure.
In recent years, to comply with US supply chain policies, Taiwanese companies have invested heavily in the US. TSMC, for example, established a plant in Arizona with a total investment exceeding $40 billion. Based on this foundation, the Taiwanese authorities hoped that the US would \"take care of Taiwan\" in trade policy.
However, evidently, Taiwan's investments and military purchases did not exempt it from tariffs. This shows that concessions to the US did not yield substantive returns.
Additionally, Taiwan's Ministry of Finance has allocated a large amount of US dollar assets to support US treasury bonds. According to reports, as of 2024, Taiwan ranks among the top ten globally in terms of holding US debt.
In terms of military procurement, Taiwan has expanded its scale for three consecutive years, with cumulative amounts reaching tens of billions of US dollars. Yet, despite these efforts, the US chose to levy a 20% tariff on Taiwan, higher than that imposed on Japan and South Korea.
The Taiwanese authorities responded cautiously, but public pressure quickly escalated. Taiwanese media and the business community generally believe that this move will directly impact local export enterprises.
Especially for small and medium-sized electronic manufacturing enterprises, whose profit margins are already limited, an additional tariff could turn profits into losses. At the same time, some enterprises worry that they will be forced to move production lines overseas, accelerating the \"de-Taiwanization\" trend.
On local online platforms, public doubts about the DPP government continue to ferment. Some questioned, \"Why kneel down so much and still face such high conditions?\" Many netizens criticized the government for focusing only on political maneuvers while neglecting substantive economic issues.
Some questioned why continuous concessions to the US did not bring concrete results. This trade shock occurred during the period of the 823 recall case. Currently, the Kuomintang has seven legislators who will undergo recall voting.
Han Kuo-yu's call to \"win again\" hopes for smooth passage for all members. However, this tariff storm may significantly change voters' judgments.
Originally focused on partisan confrontation and parliamentary performance, the recall battle has now turned into a competition of \"who can stabilize the economy.\"
For the DPP, this is not a good time, especially in local counties and cities where many manufacturing industries are concentrated, and voters feel the economic impact most directly.
Once these people turn to the blue camp due to economic losses, it will continue to pressure the green camp.
The impact of this storm will also extend beyond a single recall case to the 2026 Taiwan County Mayor elections, likely becoming a \"backlash\" outlet for this economic shock.
Currently, negotiations between Taiwan and the US have made no clear progress. If the Tsai Ing-wen administration wants to regain negotiating advantage with the US, it may need to make more concessions.
However, in reality, in recent years, Taiwan has made concessions in almost all possible areas.
Without more bargaining chips, the negotiation space will be severely constrained.
The US may continue to maintain a 20% tariff as the norm, waiting for Taiwan to propose new conditions.
Taiwan's limited economic size makes it difficult to sustain high concessions in military, agricultural, and manufacturing sectors in the long term.
Moreover, with the current global economic downturn, Taiwan's exports to the US are continuing to decline.
Under high tariffs, the decline in corporate revenue will affect tax revenues, employment, and investment confidence.
This series of reactions will pose a comprehensive challenge to the Tsai Ing-wen administration.
The US's attitude also proves once again that it prioritizes interests over gestures.
Even if the DPP is pro-US, it will not change the US's pragmatic stance.
Currently, the Kuomintang continues to pursue the tariff issue.
Party chairman Eric Chu publicly criticized the US's 20% tariff, combined with a 12xchange rate loss, equating to a huge blow to Taiwanese export companies.
Han Kuo-yu advocates for the Kuomintang to \"maintain a low profile\" to avoid giving the DPP an opportunity to counterattack.
Now it seems that the DPP is clearly at a disadvantage in negotiating with the US, while the blue camp wants to gain more support from the 823 recall case.
The outcome will depend on how Taiwanese public opinion develops in the coming weeks.
This time, the US did not show mercy.
From tariff increases to denied visits and no benefits from various concessions, all signs indicate a change in the US stance.
The DPP's attempt to gain economic benefits through diplomatic gestures now seems ineffective.
Han Kuo-yu's call to \"win again\" is just the beginning, and the key is how Tsai Ing-wen will respond next.
If handled poorly, not only will 823 be lost, but the entire 2026 county mayor elections may also be lost.
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